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1.  Introduction 
In this paper, I discuss the semantics of certain instances of non-canonical 
genitive Case in Russian. I use the term non-canonical genitive Case to refer to 
the phenomena whereby an object of the verb is assigned genitive Case, rather 
than accusative. More specifically, I discuss two phenomena: Genitive of 
Negation and Intensional Genitive. The paper is organized as follows. First, I 
introduce the two phenomena. In Section 2, I demonstrate that they share 
numerous properties and, therefore, a unifying account is preferable. Previously 
proposed analyses of non-canonical genitive Case are briefly discussed in Section 
3. In Section 4, I propose a new direction for analyzing the phenomena in 
question. I present part of my on-going research on the topic and argue that the 
choice of the Case of the object in the discussed environments is dependent on 
existential commitment. I suggest that this notion, once appropriately elaborated, 
makes it possible to account for both the distribution of genitive objects and their 
semantic properties. Finally, in Section 5, the relation between absence of 
existential commitment and the semantics of NPs is examined. It is proposed that 
NPs that lack existential commitment in the sense formulated in Section 4 denote 
properties, rather than referring to or quantifying over objects in any given world. 
I therefore propose that the non-canonical genitive Case is assigned to property-
denoting NPs.  
 
1.1.   Genitive of Negation 
 
Genitive of Negation is a well-documented phenomenon whereby a non-oblique 
internal argument of the verb, which is generally assigned accusative Case, as in 
(1a), can be optionally assigned genitive Case under negation, as is exemplified in 
(1b). 
 
(1)   a.  Ja pil     vodu / *vody 
              I  drank water(acc) / (gen) 
               ‘I drank water / I was drinking water.’ 
    b.  Ja ne      pil     vodu / vody. 
               I  NEG drank water(acc)/(gen) 
               ‘I didn’t drink water.’  
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T. Friedman and M. Gibson (eds), SALT XVII 148-165, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityUnder negation, the NP voda ‘water’ can appear either in the accusative or in the 
genitive Case. Importantly, in the corresponding affirmative clause in (1a), only 
accusative Case is possible. Thus, it is negation that licenses the assignment of the 
genitive Case.  
 
1.2.  Intensional Genitive 
 
The second phenomenon to be analyzed in this paper is Intensional Genitive.   
This is the phenomenon whereby certain intensional verbs license both genitive 
and accusative Case-marking on their direct objects. These verbs include verbs 
meaning “to wish”, “to want”, “to deserve”, “to ask for”, “to demand”, “to wait 
for” and others. The phenomenon is exemplified in (2). 
 
(2)  a.  On ždal      uda  /  Dimu. 
                   He waited miracle(gen) / Dima(acc) 
                 ‘He was waiting for a miracle / for Dima.’ 
      b.   Ty    zasluživaeš     medali / medal’. 
                  You deserve           medal(gen sg) / (acc sg) 
                  ‘You deserve a medal.’ 
 
In (2a), the NP  uda ‘a miracle’ appears in the genitive Case. In contrast, the NP 
Dima is obligatorily marked accusative Case. In (2b), the NP medal’ ‘a medal’ 
can appear in either accusative or genitive Case. 
  It can be seen that with intensional verbs, the genitive Case-assignment is 
not always optional. In some sentences, it is obligatory, in some sentences, 
optional, and sometimes only accusative Case can be assigned. 
  It should also be pointed out that not all intensional predicates ever license 
genitive Case-marking on their objects. For instance, the object NPs of such verbs 
as predvidet’ ‘foresee’ and predstavljat’ ‘imagine’ are obligatorily accusative. An 
account of these restrictions will be provided in Section 4.3 below. 
 
  
2.  Intensional Genitive and Genitive of Negation as a Single Phenomenon 
Genitive of Negation is discussed in the literature much more often than 
Intensional Genitive and is normally given an analysis independently from the 
second phenomenon. However, following Neidle (1988), I believe that a unifying 
analysis should be proposed. This conclusion is drawn on the basis of numerous 
similarities that hold between the two phenomena.  
  Firstly, both phenomena constitute a genitive/accusative alternation in the 
Case of the object.  
  Secondly, the same semantic factors appear to affect the choice of Case 
within both phenomena. Before I turn to listing these factors, it is important to 
emphasize that all of them merely constitute tendencies in the choice of Case. The 
existence of some of these tendencies has been noted by Timberlake (1986), 
Neidle (1988), Bailyn (1997) and Babyonyshev (2003), among others.  
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Firstly, abstract nouns are more likely to be assigned genitive Case than concrete 
ones. This tendency is demonstrated in (3) for Genitive of Negation and in (4-5) 
for Intensional Genitive. 
 
(3)   a.   On ne      našol ???s ast’je / s ast’ja. 
                  he NEG found      happiness(acc)/(gen) 
                 ‘He didn’t find happiness.’ 
  b.   On ne     našol cvetok / ???cvetka. 
                  he NEG found flower(acc sg)/(gen sg)  
                  ‘He didn’t find a / the flower.’   
(4)   a.   Dima ždjot  uda / * udo. 
                  Dima waits miracle(gen sg)/(acc sg) 
                  ‘Dima is waiting for a miracle.’ 
  b.   Dima ždjot posylku / *posylki. 
                  Dima waits parcel(acc sg)/(gen sg) 
                  ‘Dima is waiting for a parcel.’ 
(5)   a.   on iš et   prikliu enij / ?priklju enija 
                  he seeks adventures(gen pl)/(acc pl) 
                  'He is seeking adventures.’ 
  b.   on iš et   knigi / *knig.  
                  he seeks books(acc pl)/(gen pl) 
                  ‘He is seeking books.’  
 
ii) Number 
In addition, genitive is more often assigned to plural NPs than to singular ones. 
Thus, Genitive of Negation is acceptable in (6a) but not in (6b). Similarly, most of 
my informants accept (7a), under the meaning according to which the speaker is 
waiting for a plant to blossom, but not (7b), its counterpart with a singular object. 
 
(6)   a.   Ja  ne     našol  cvety / cvetov. 
                  I   NEG found flowers(acc pl)/(gen pl) 
                  ‘I didn’t find (the) flowers.’ 
  b.   Ja ne      našol  cvetok / ???cvetka. 
                  I   NEG found flower(acc sg)/(gen sg)   
                  ‘I didn’t find a / the flower.’           (Timberlake 1986:342) 
(7)   a.   Ja ždu  cvetov. 
                  I   wait flowers(gen pl) 
                  ‘I am waiting for flowers.’ 
  b.   ??? Ja ždu  cvetka. 
                         I   wait flower(gen sg) 
                       ‘I am waiting for a flower.’ 
 
iii) Definiteness 
Thirdly, genitive is more likely to be assigned to indefinite NPs than to definite 
ones. The NP novyje ukrašenija ‘new jewels’ is more likely to appear in the  
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 (8)   a.   Lena ne      kupila   eti      ukrašenija / ???etix ukrašenij 
                  Lena NEG bought [these jewels](acc pl)/(gen pl) 
                  ‘Lena didn’t buy these jewels.’ 
  b.   Lena ne      kupila   novyje ukrašenija / novyx ukrašenij. 
                  Lena NEG bought [new      jewels](acc pl)/(gen pl) 
                  ‘Lena didn’t buy new jewels.’ 
 (9)   a.   Lena potrebovala eti      ukrašenija / ???etix ukrašenij 
                  Lena demanded   [these jewels](acc pl)/(gen pl) 
  b.   Lena potrebovala novyje ukrašenija / novyx ukrašenij. 
                  Lena demanded   [new    jewels](acc pl)/(gen pl) 
 
iv) Proper / Common 
Among definite NPs, proper names are less likely to be marked genitive than NPs 
headed by common nouns. Thus, the proper name Lena in (10a) cannot appear in 
the genitive Case, in contrast to the definite NP etot razgovor ‘this talk’ in (10b), 
which contains a demonstrative. A similar pattern holds in (11). The proper name 
functioning as the object of the intensional verb ždat’ ‘wait’ is obligatorily 
accusative. In contrast, the definite NP eta vstre a ‘this meeting’ is at least 
preferable in the genitive Case. 
 
(10)   a.   Petja ne   pomnit     Lenu / *Leny. 
                  Petja not remember Lena(acc)/(gen) 
  b.   Petja ne   pomnit      etot razgovor / etogo razgovora. 
                  Petja not remember [this talk](acc sg)/(gen sg)  
                  ‘Petja doesn’t remember this talk.’ 
(11)   a.   Ivan ždjot Annu / *Anny. 
                  Ivan waits Anna(acc)/(gen) 
                  ‘Ivan is waiting for Anna.’ 
  b.   Ivan ždjot ???etu vstre u / etoj vstre i. 
                  Ivan waits      this meeting(acc sg)/(gen sg) 
                  ‘Ivan is waiting for this meeting.’ 
 
v) Specificity and Scope 
In addition, genitive NPs are normally interpreted as non-specific and taking 
narrow scope. Their accusative counterparts may be interpreted as either specific 
or not. (The examples in 12 are taken from Harves 2002.) 
 
(12)   a.   Anna ne      kupila  knigi.    
                  Anna NEG bought books(acc pl) 
                  ‘Anna didn’t buy (the) books.’ 
  b.   Anna ne     kupila  knig.       
                  Anna NEG bought books(gen pl) 
                  ‘Anna didn’t buy (any) books.’ 
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                  Dima seeks [Swedish stamps](acc pl) 
                  ‘Dima is seeking Swedish stamps.’ 
  b.   na al’nik trebujet   pribyli.     
                  boss         demands profit(gen) 
                  ‘The boss demands profit.’ 
 
Thus, (12b) entails that Anna did not buy any books. The object NP obligatorily 
receives a non-specific, narrow scope interpretation. In turn, (12a), in which the 
object is accusative, is ambiguous. Under its salient reading, it means that there is 
a particular set of books (possibly but not necessarily familiar from the context) 
that Anna did not buy. In this case, the indefinite NP takes wide scope relative to 
the negative operator. The second, less salient meaning of the sentence is 
essentially identical to the one available to (12b), as discussed above. 
  In turn, consider the sentences in (13), which contain intensional verbs. 
(13a) may either mean that Dima is looking for a particular set of Swedish stamps 
or that he is interested in any stamps from Sweden. In turn, the object NP in (13b) 
may only get a non-specific, narrow scope reading. This sentence means roughly 
that the boss demands that the employees work in such a way that there be profit. 
 
vi) Existential Commitment   
Finally, Case-assignment within both phenomena is equally sensitive to 
existential commitment. I assume that an NP carries existential commitment iff 
the sentence in which it appears either entails or presupposes that the NP 
quantifies over a non-empty set (or has a referent, in case the NP in question is 
individual-denoting rather than quantificational).  
  Both under negation and following intensional predicates, genitive NPs 
lack existential commitment, in contrast to accusative objects, for which 
existential commitment is certainly possible, though not obligatory. 
 
(14)   a.   Dima ne  našol  sledy. 
                  Dima not found traces(acc pl) 
                  Dima didn’t find the/any traces. 
  b.   Dima ne  našol  sledov. 
                  Dima not found traces(gen pl) 
                  ‘Dima didn’t find any traces.’ 
 
If the object NP appears in the accusative Case, as in (14a), the sentence suggests 
that relevant traces were actually left, but Dima failed to find them. In contrast, if 
the NP is genitive, the possibility becomes salient that no traces were left, and that 
is why, naturally, Dima did not find any. It should be emphasized that accusative 
NPs do not always carry existential commitment; this is only a tendency. Genitive 
objects, in turn, strongly tend to lack such a commitment. 
  Let us now turn to complements of opaque verbs. The fact that accusative 
NPs are compatible with existential commitment is revealed in (11a), in which a 
proper name appears in the accusative Case. The sentences in (15), in turn, 
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existence. (15a) means that the speaker will be waiting for the addressee’s new 
stories to be written; namely, the object NP does not have a referent in the actual 
world. According to my informants, the sentence does not mean that the speaker 
is waiting to receive copies of already existing stories. In turn, (15b) can be 
uttered in the following context: the water is currently cold, and Lena has turned 
on a boiler in order to heat it. Crucially, according to this reading, the NP hot 
water does not refer to an entity that exists in the actual world. Thus, existential 
commitment is absent. 
 
(15)   a.   Ja budu s      neterpeniem ždat’ vašix novyx rasskazov. 
                  I   will  with impatience    wait [your new     stories](gen pl) 
                 ‘I will be waiting impatiently for your new stories.’ 
  b.   Lena ždjot gorja ej  vody. 
                 Lena waits hot(gen) water(gen) 
                  ‘Lena is waiting for a hot water.’ 
 
I have listed a number of properties that affect Case-assignment both to 
complements of opaque verbs and to objects under negation.  
  An additional similarity between Genitive of Negation and Intensional 
Genitive has to do with the fact that both phenomena are associated with a 
considerable amount of variation in native speakers’ judgments. Thus, native 
speakers of Russian often disagree as to whether an NP can appear in the genitive 
Case in a given sentence or not. It is important to point out that speakers who are 
relatively reluctant to accept Genitive of Negation are similarly reluctant to accept 
Intensional Genitive. Such a variation does not normally characterize judgments 
related to Case-assignment. This factor is probably a by-product of the process of 
language change taking place in Russian, which is also mentioned by Neidle. She 
notes that, within both phenomena under discussion, accusative Case is used now 
with increasing frequency.  
  Finally, it appears that across Balto-Slavic languages, there is a strong 
correlation between the presence and the obligatoriness of Genitive of Negation 
on the one hand and of Intensional Genitive on the other. Thus, in those 
languages, in which Genitive of Negation is obligatory, opaque verbs in question 
generally consistently take genitive objects. In those languages in which Genitive 
of Negation is optional as it is in Russian, opaque verbs also license both genitive 
and accusative objects. Finally, if Genitive of Negation is essentially absent in a 
language, Intensional Genitive is also absent, most intensional verbs normally 
taking accusative complements. There do exist certain exceptions to this 
correlation, however. (Thus, in Slovenian, Genitive of Negation is obligatory, but 
Intensional Genitive is optional, and in Polish, both phenomena are generally 
obligatory, but there do exist certain opaque verbs that license accusative Case-
marking.) The facts are summarized in Table 1 below.  
  On the basis of this discussion I conclude that Genitive of Negation and 
Intensional Genitive constitute different instantiations of the same phenomenon, 
which I will refer to as Irrealis Genitive. 
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Old Church Slavonic  obligatory  obligatory 
Lithuanian obligatory  obligatory 
Russian optional optional 
Ukrainian optional  optional 
Belarusian optional  optional 
Latvian optional  optional 
Serbo-Croatian essentially  absent  essentially  absent 
Czech  essentially absent  essentially absent 
Slovenian obligatory optional 
Polish obligatory  ?obligatory  /  ?optional
 
Table 1 
 
 
3.  Previous Analyses 
It should be pointed out that Genitive of Negation has received much more 
attention in the literature than Intensional Genitive, and, thus, numerous analyses 
that focus on the former phenomenon do not make reference to the latter. In 
addition, most of these analyses are syntactic, focusing on the mechanism by 
which the genitive and accusative Case-features are checked (e.g. Bailyn 1997). 
  One of the exceptions, a unified account of the two phenomena that makes 
reference to both syntactic and semantic properties involved, is provided by 
Neidle (1988). Neidle proposes that the choice of Case is determined by the 
[Quantifying] feature ([+/-Q]). The feature [+Q] is contributed to the VP node 
both by the negation operator and by opaque verbs, and it functions as a scope 
marker. This feature further spreads to the object NP if the latter appears within 
the scope of the operator. In this case, the object will be marked genitive. In 
contrast, the feature [+Q] will not spread to an NP that takes wide scope relative 
to negation or an opaque verb. Such an NP will appear in the accusative Case.  
  The fact that this approach allows for a unifying account of Genitive of 
Negation and Intensional Genitive is an important advantage of this analysis. 
However, it has two substantial shortcomings. Firstly, scope relations are not 
sufficient to account for the Case alternation in either of the two phenomena since 
accusative NPs can take both narrow and wide scope relative to negation or an 
opaque verb. Secondly, it is not perfectly clear why the [Quantifying] feature 
should be contributed by negation and opaque verbs but not by other 
quantificational operators, such as, for instance, the generic operator. An NP can 
appear either within or outside the scope of such an operator; still, genitive Case-
assignment to objects is not licensed in generic and habitual sentences. 
 
 
4.  Irrealis Genitive and Existential Commitment: The Proposal 
 
The sensitivity of the choice of Case to the semantic properties of the NP, even in 
those cases in which they do not seem to affect the syntactic configuration in any 
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semantically restricted. I propose, following in part the discussion in Section 2, 
that the key property to which the Case-marking pattern is sensitive is 
commitment to existence – crucially, not only existence in the actual world but 
also in any given possible world that is made salient in the sentence (in the sense 
to be specified below). For instance, John didn’t find (any) documents neither 
entails nor presupposes that (relevant) documents exist in the actual world, nor in 
any particular alternative version of reality introduced in the sentence. 
  Below, I will argue that the distribution of Irrealis Genitive is determined 
by the following restriction: An NP may appear in this Case if and only if it lacks 
commitment to existence in any given possible world that is made salient in the 
given sentence. In Sections 4.1 and 4.2 below, I clarify the relevant notions that 
make it possible to distinguish existential commitment in the traditional sense of 
the term (i.e. commitment that an NP quantifies over a nonempty set in the actual 
world) and a weaker version of existential commitment – namely, a commitment 
that the relevant set is not empty in some salient version of reality which may 
differ from w0. In Section 4.3 I formulate the rule that restricts the distribution of 
Irrealis Genitive Case. Then, in Sections 4.4 and 4.5, I demonstrate how this 
restriction accounts for the distribution of genitive objects and for their semantic 
properties, respectively. 
 
4.1.  Assertions and Possible Worlds 
 
I assume that by default, a sentence constitutes an assertion about the actual 
world. Even if a given sentence contains a modal operator, the assertion as a 
whole is still valid for w0. Thus, (16) does not entail that the speaker’s sister is at 
home at w0; however, her possibly being at home is claimed to be true in w0. 
 
(16)  My sister may be at home. 
 
Similarly, presuppositions contributed by various constituents in a sentence tend 
to contain information about reality. Thus, the subject NP in (16) presupposes that 
the speaker has a sister in the actual world.  
  Still, as discussed extensively by Farkas (1985, 2003) and Heim (1992), 
among others, sentences may contribute information about possible worlds other 
than the actual one. For instance, consider such intensional verbs as think and 
believe. Sentences that contain these verbs make an assertion not only about w0 
but also about those worlds that conform to the vision of reality of the attitude 
holder. 
 
(17)   Mary thinks that a unicorn entered her house. 
(17')    think (Mary,  x [unicorn (x)  enter (x, Mary’s-house)]) 
 
Thus, (17) as a whole makes an assertion about the actual world: it is in the actual 
world that Mary is entailed to have a certain belief. In addition, however, the 
sentence makes an assertion about a set of alternative versions of reality, in 
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possible world which conforms to Mary’s worldview,  it holds that a unicorn 
entered Mary’s house. (Thus, 17' is essentially equivalent to 17'' below.) 
Quantification over this particular set of worlds is introduced by the intensional 
verb thinks.  
 
(17'')   w[w  WM,wo    x [unicorn (x,w)  enter (x, Mary’s-house,w)])] 
            where WM,wo stands for the set of all possible worlds that conform to  
           Mary’s vision of reality 
 
Thus, in (17), the intensional verb introduces an accessibility relation to a certain 
set of worlds, and the embedded proposition is asserted to be true in these worlds. 
The state of affairs is not the same with all modal or intensional operators. For 
instance, Heim (1992) and Farkas (2003) distinguish two types of intensional 
verbs that differ crucially in the relevant respect. Thus, according to Heim, such 
verbs as think and believe do contribute an assertion about a particular set of 
worlds (one that represents the beliefs of the attitude holder, as discussed above). 
These verbs introduce an accessibility relation to a certain set of worlds, in which 
their complement is asserted to hold. Following the terminology in Farkas (2003), 
I will refer to verbs of this class as strong intensional verbs. In addition to such 
verbs as think and believe, this class includes reported assertion predicates (e.g. 
say) and fiction predicates (e.g. dream and imagine). In contrast, the complement 
of desiderative predicates such as want is not entailed to be true in any given set 
of worlds. Rather, intensional predicates of this type trigger a world ranking, 
whereby the worlds in which the proposition contributed by the complement 
clause is true are ordered higher than the ones in which it is false. According to 
this view, a sentence like John wants to find a unicorn does not introduce a set of 
worlds in which the proposition John finds a unicorn is asserted to hold. Rather, it 
asserts that, as far as John is concerned, those worlds in which the latter 
proposition is true are ranked higher than the ones in which it is not. Verbs of the 
latter type are classified by Farkas (2003) as weak intensional verbs. 
  Thus, some intensional operators introduce sets of possible worlds in 
which the embedded propositions are entailed to be true, whereas others do not, 
their semantic contribution being of a different nature. As discussed by Farkas 
(2003), this contrast has important consequences for the choice of mood in the 
embedded clause. In particular, weak intensional verbs, but not strong ones, 
license subjunctive mood. In Section 4.4 of this paper, it will be revealed that the 
same distinction affects the choice of Case in Russian.  
  
4.2.  Absolute and Relative Existential Commitment 
 
As discussed in the previous section, a sentence may involve assertions made not 
only about the actual world but also about alternative versions of reality 
introduced by a modal or intensional operator. Similarly, an NP that appears in 
such a sentence may carry commitment to existence in the actual world or in any 
of these alternative possible worlds.  
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NP carries commitment to existence in the actual world. For instance, (19a) 
entails and (19b) presupposes (19'), i.e. the existence of at least one green dog in 
w0. 
(19)   a.   Mary patted a green dog. 
  b.   Mary patted the green dog. 
(19')    x [dog (x)  green (x)] 
  
In the presence of a non-veridical or intensional operator, existential commitment 
of this type can be canceled. However, in most cases, it will be substituted by a 
commitment that the NP in question has a referent in some alternative possible 
world which is introduced in the sentence. For instance, (17), repeated below, 
does not entail the existence of a unicorn in w0. This results from the fact that the 
indefinite NP is interpreted within the scope of an intensional predicate. However, 
the sentence does entail that there exists at least one unicorn in all those worlds 
that are compatible with Mary’s beliefs. The same verb that cancels existential 
commitment in w0 introduces a set of worlds relative to which existential 
commitment is present. 
 
(17)   Mary thinks that a unicorn entered her house. 
 
An analogous example is provided in (20), which contains an epistemic 
possibility operator.   
 
(20)   A unicorn may have entered the house. 
(20')     x [unicorn (x)  entered (x, the-house)] 
(20'')    w  x [unicorn (x,w)  entered (x, the-house,w)] 
 
Under the salient reading of the sentence, represented by two equivalent formulae 
(20') and (20''), the subject NP is interpreted within the scope of the modal may. 
As a result, the sentence does not entail existence of a unicorn in the actual world. 
However, the sentence involves quantification over a set of possible worlds, in 
this case, the epistemically accessible worlds (at least under the most likely 
interpretation). It entails that in at least one of these worlds, it is true that a 
unicorn entered the house. This, in turn, entails that in at least one of these worlds, 
a unicorn does exist. Thus, while existential commitment relative to the actual 
world is absent, we do find commitment to existence in (an)other possible 
world(s).  
  As will be demonstrated in the next section, this latter notion of relativized 
existential commitment is important for explaining the distribution of Irrealis 
Genitive. Therefore, for the current purposes, I will distinguish two types of 
commitment to existence, defined below. Absolute Existential Commitment 
(AEC) is existential commitment in the traditional sense, i.e. a commitment to 
existence in the actual world. In turn, the term Relative Existential Commitment 
(REC) captures the notion that has been introduced in this section: this is a 
commitment to existence in w0 or in any alternative possible world that stands to 
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may be introduced by a modal or intensional operator, e.g. a propositional attitude 
verb, e.g. think, or a modal verb, e.g. should, may.) In the definition (21) below all 
such worlds are subsumed under the set W
S. Essentially, REC is commitment to 
existence in those possible worlds about which an assertion is being made in the 
sentence, or relative to which the sentence contains presuppositions. 
 
(21)  Let S be a sentence with propositional content p. Let NP be a noun phrase  
that contributes the property P. Let w0 be the actual world. Let encode 
entailment and/or presupposition relation.  
 
 a.  An occurrence of an NP in S carries Absolute Existential Commitment  
iff p    x (x,w )   P 0
iff  w  [w   W
S  p   x P(x,w)] 
        b.  An occurrence of an NP in S carries Relative Existential Commitment  
  
It can be seen from (21) that an NP that carries AEC, obligatorily carries REC as 
well. The actual world is always by default included in the set W
S, and therefore, 
once commitment to existence in the actual world is present, it necessarily follows 
that there is existential commitment relative to at least one world in W
S.  
  As illustrated in (17) and (20) above, in the vast majority of cases, an NP 
that lacks AEC is still characterized by REC. However, within the scope of 
certain operators, even REC may be absent. In the next section, I argue that 
Irrealis Genitive Case can be assigned only to those NPs that lack REC.   
 
4.3.  Irrealis Genitive and Relative Existential Commitment 
As has been demonstrated in Section 2 above, NPs that appear in Irrealis Genitive 
Case consistently lack Absolute Existential Commitment. Importantly, these NPs 
must lack Relative Existential Commitment as well.  
  First, it should be pointed out that both negation and the intensional verbs 
that license Irrealis Genitive cancel REC. Thus, consider the sentences in (22): 
 
(22)  a.  Mary is waiting for a miracle. 
       b.   Mary didn’t find a solution to the problem.  
 
(22a) does not entail the existence of the relevant miracle in the actual world, nor 
does it entail that the miracle has taken place in an alternative version of reality 
which is, in some way or other, introduced into the picture by the verb wait. For 
instance, the sentence does not entail that the miracle has taken place in the 
worlds that conform to Mary’s view of reality (on the opposite, the fact that Mary 
is waiting for the miracle means that she believes it has not yet taken place). In 
this sense wait belongs to the same class of intensional verbs as want, whose 
properties have been discussed in section 4.1: its complement is not entailed to 
hold in any particular possible world. Rather, it introduces a ranking of possible 
worlds relative to a certain anchor (the subject of the sentence). According to 
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ones in which it doesn’t. But existential commitment of any type is absent. 
  Similarly, REC does not characterize the indefinite NP in (22b). Negation 
cancels AEC of the NP that is interpreted within its scope: the sentence does not 
entail that in the actual world, there exists a solution to the problem in question. In 
addition, the negative operator does not introduce any alternative possible worlds 
in which such a solution is entailed (or presupposed) to exist.  
  It can thus be observed that, unlike most intensional and non-veridical 
operators, negation and certain intensional verbs can cancel REC. This, I believe, 
explains the fact that Irrealis Genitive is licensed specifically by these operators. I 
propose that the assignment of Irrealis Genitive Case is subject to the restriction 
formulated in (23) below: 
 
(23)  An NP that appears in the direct object position in a sentence S may be   
             assigned Irrealis Genitive Case iff 
¬ w [w  W
S  p   x P(x,w)] 
 
 (where S, W
S, p and P are as in 21 above) 
 
Essentially, (23) states that NPs that appear in Irrealis Genitive must lack REC. 
This restriction accounts for both the distribution and the semantic properties of 
genitive objects, as is revealed below. 
 
4.4.  Distribution 
Firstly, the approach to Irrealis Genitive developed above captures the fact that 
this Case is licensed specifically by negation and intensional predicates, since 
these constitute the rare operators that cancel REC, as discussed above. 
  In addition, the notion of REC makes it possible to account for the fact 
that some intensional verbs but not others can take genitive complements. Table 2 
below lists a number of Russian intensional verbs, dividing them into two groups. 
The verbs in the left column license Irrealis Genitive; the verbs in the right 
column do not. 
 
Opaque Verbs that License Genitive 
Case-Assignment 
Opaque Verbs that do not License 
Genitive Case-Assignment 
xotet’ (want), želat’ (wish), žaždat’ 
(thirst for), trebovat’ (demand), prosit’ 
(ask for), ždat’ (wait), ožidat’ (wait, 
expect), iskat’ (look for, seek), izbegat’ 
(avoid), zasluživat’ (deserve), stoit’ 
(cost, be worth), bojat’sja (be afraid of) 
predvidet’ (foresee), predskazyvat’ 
(foretell),  predstavljat’ (imagine), 
risovat’ (paint), izobražat’ (picture), 
napominat’ (remind, resemble), 
planirovat’ (plan), obeš at’ (promise) 
 
Table 2 
 
The verbs that appear in the right column are strong intensional predicates, which, 
similarly to think, introduce sets of possible worlds in which their complement is 
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worlds that are compatible with the subject’s view of the future. Consequently, 
complement NPs of these verbs carry REC: they are entailed to quantify over a 
non-empty set in those possible worlds that are introduced by the predicate. For 
instance, (24), whose formal representation is provided in (24'), entails (24''); in 
other words, it entails the existence of a thunderstorm in all the possible worlds 
that conform to Masha’s vision of the future. (24' and 24'' are essentially 
equivalent.) 
 
(24)  Maša   predvidit grozu. 
        Masha foresees   thunderstorm(acc sg) 
        ‘Masha foresees a thunderstorm.’  
(24')   forsees (Masha,  x (thunderstorm, x)) 
(24'')  w [w  W1   x (thunderstorm, x, w)] 
          where  W1 is the set of all possible worlds that conform to Masha’s  
  vision of the future. 
 
Thus, by the definition in (21b), the object NP carries REC. This is why Irrealis 
Genitive is not licensed.  
  In contrast, the verbs in the left column of Table 2 constitute weak 
intensional predicates. The Romanian counterparts of most of these verbs are 
classified as such by Farkas; all the verbs in this column license subjunctive 
mood. These verbs do not introduce possible worlds in which their complement 
clauses are entailed to be true but rather trigger world ranking. When they take 
nominal complements, the latter are allowed to lack commitment to existence in 
any particular world. For instance, none of the variants of (25) entails the 
existence of the relevant answer in any given version of reality: 
 
(25)  On ždjot / trebujet / zasluživaet otveta.  
        He waits / demands / deserves   answer(gen sg) 
        ‘He is waiting for / demands / deserves an answer.’ 
 
The verbs do introduce an accessibility relation to worlds in which their clausal 
complements would be entailed to hold and their nominal complements, to exist. 
Thus, in (25), REC is absent and Irrealis Genitive, available. 
  It can thus be seen that the distinction between weak and strong 
intensional predicates together with the restriction in (23) above predicts correctly 
which intensional verbs license genitive objects and which do not.  
  Let us now turn to genitive Case-assignment under negation. A close look 
reveals that not every negated verb licenses Irrealis Genitive objects either. In 
particular, this Case is unavailable if the verb, by some mechanism or other, 
triggers an existential presupposition of its complement. For instance, the 
sentences in (26) are judged unacceptable by my informants, despite the fact that 
the genitive NPs are plural and may (or even have to) receive non-specific, 
indefinite, narrow scope readings. In other words, in terms of their semantic 
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Irrealis Genitive. 
 
(26)  a.   *On ne     pere ityval otvetov. 
                    He NEG reread        answers(gen pl) 
                    ‘He didn’t reread answers.’  
       b.    ???Oby no    ja ne     otstiryvaju pjaten. 
                        Generally I   NEG wash-out   stains(gen pl) 
                       ‘Generally, I don’t (succeed to) take stains out.’ 
      
These sentences become acceptable once the genitive NPs are substituted by their 
accusative counterparts.  
  Consider (26a). The verb pere ityvat’  ‘reread’, similarly to its English 
counterpart, triggers a presupposition that one reading event has already taken 
place. Thus, the sentence (27), whose logical form is provided in (27'), 
presupposes that John has read the answer in question at least once before (27''). 
 
(27)   John reread an answer. 
(27')    x [answer (x)   reread (John, x)]    entailment  
(27'')    x [answer (x)  read (John, x)]    presupposition 
 
The existence of an answer is entailed not only by (27') but also by (27''). Since 
(27'') constitutes a presupposition, it follows that the existence of the answer is 
both entailed and presupposed by (27).  
  Once the sentence is negated, as in (28), (27') is no longer entailed, and the 
sentence no longer entails the existence of a relevant answer. 
 
(28)   John didn’t reread an answer. 
 
However, presuppositions are generally sustained under negation, unless 
metalinguistic negation is involved (Horn 1989, among others); therefore, (31) 
does presuppose that one event of John reading the answer has taken place. The 
speaker denies a repetition of this event, but does assume that one reading event 
did occur. In other words, while (27') is no longer entailed, (27'') is still 
presupposed. This, in turn, means that (28) does presuppose the existence of the 
relevant answer. (If John has read an answer once, then the answer has to exist.) 
This means that the object NP keeps carrying existential commitment under 
negation, by virtue of the properties of the verb reread. By this mechanism, the 
object NP in (26a) carries existential presupposition. For this reason, it cannot 
appear in Irrealis Genitive: it is characterized by existential commitment. 
  The same holds for (26b). The verb otstiryvat’ ‘wash out’ presupposes the 
existence of stains to be taken out. Under its salient reading, the sentence asserts 
that in those situations in which clothes are stained, the speaker does not succeed 
to take out the latter (or does not even try to). Thus, existential commitment is 
present.  
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acceptable with the genitive object, in which case it has to be interpreted as: 
Taking out stains is not a kind of activity that I engage in. Note that under this 
reading, existence of any stains is not presupposed.)  
  To sum up, it can be concluded that Irrealis Genitive Case is not available 
under negation as long as the predicate contributes an existential presupposition to 
its complement. This generalization further supports the claim that Irrealis 
Genitive is licensed if and only if existential commitment of any type is absent.   
 
4.5.  Semantic Properties 
 
In addition to accounting for the distribution of Irrealis Genitive Case, the 
existential commitment approach also explains the semantic restrictions on its 
assignment that have been discussed in Section 2.  
  Firstly, as noted in Section 2, Irrealis Genitive is only assigned to those 
NPs that receive a narrow scope reading. This is not surprising under the proposed 
approach, given that negation and intensional predicates can only cancel 
existential commitment of those NPs that are interpreted within their scope. An 
NP that takes wide scope will be interpreted as quantifying over entities in the 
actual world (or referring to ones, depending on its semantic type), and will carry 
Absolute (and, therefore, also Relative) Existential Commitment.  
  Secondly, it has been noted that genitive NPs tend to be indefinite. I 
believe that there is no inherent incompatibility between Irrealis Genitive and 
definiteness per se. Rather, definite NPs normally carry existential presupposition. 
Since NPs that appear in Irrealis Genitive have to lack existential commitment, 
accusative Case-assignment results. However, under negation, a definite NP can 
sometimes lose the presupposition of existence, and in that case, it can be 
assigned Irrealis Genitive. Thus, consider (29). 
 
(29)  Petja ne      pomnit       etot  razgovor / etogo razgovora. 
        Petja NEG remember [this talk](acc sg) /(gen sg) 
        ‘Petja doesn’t remember this talk.’ 
 
The NP this talk can appear in genitive Case, as long as the sentence does not 
carry a commitment that the talk in question actually took place. Thus, according 
to the genitive variant of (29) it is certainly possible that the talk did not take 
place and that is why Petja cannot remember it. This demonstrates that a definite 
NP can be assigned Irrealis Genitive, but only as long as it lacks an existential 
presupposition
1. 
                                                 
1In a highly restricted range of environments (primarily in existential sentences), Genitive of 
Negation can be assigned to definite NPs that do presuppose existence, including proper names. 
For reasons of space I will not be able to discuss these environments in this paper. To formulate 
briefly the direction for capturing the facts, I assume, following work by Borshev and Partee, that 
in existential sentences, existence is always checked relative to a location in a world (and not 
merely the world as a whole). As a result, existential commitment is also shifted to a commitment 
that the set an NP quantifies over is not empty in a given location. As a result, NPs that carry 
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expected, given that specific NPs generally encode individuals in the actual 
world. They take wide scope and carry AEC. A possible exception is constituted 
by such NPs as a unicorn in (17), repeated below: 
 
(17)  Mary thinks that a unicorn entered her house.  
 
Under some (though not all) approaches to specificity, this NP is analyzed as 
specific, as long as Mary is assumed to have a particular unicorn in mind whom 
she believes to have eaten the petunias. Importantly, even if such an approach to 
specificity is adopted, we still have to maintain that a specific NP obligatorily 
carries existential commitment. Thus, although the embedded subject in (17) is 
not likely to bear AEC, it certainly does carry REC, since the sentence entails that 
the unicorn exists in those possible worlds that conform to Mary’s view of reality. 
Thus, specific NPs obligatorily carry commitment to existence – most typically, 
the absolute one, and in some cases possibly the relative one (if they encode a 
particular entity within the worldview of an individual other than the speaker). In 
any event, they are predicted to be incompatible with Irrealis Genitive Case, and 
the prediction is borne out.   
 
 
5.  Why Is Existential Commitment Important? 
 
I have argued in the previous section that an NP may appear in Irrealis Genitive if 
and only if it lacks REC. While this restriction accounts successfully for both the 
semantic properties of genitive objects and their distribution, a question emerges 
as to why Case-assignment should be sensitive to such a property as REC. In this 
final section, I provide a tentative answer to this question, although a more 
detailed investigation of the issue is still required.  
  I believe that this property (or rather, its absence) has important 
consequences for the semantics of the NP. Let us assume, following Montague, 
that the default interpretation of an NP is intensional, and that it may then receive 
an extensional reading once embedded in an extensional environment. Let us also 
assume that bare NPs denote properties (see e.g. Carlson 1977 on English and 
McNally 2004 on Spanish), again, with the potential to undergo a type-shift if the 
latter is forced by the environment in which they are merged (see discussion of 
type-shift in Partee 1986).  
  Importantly, Russian is a language that lacks articles; therefore, the vast 
majority of NPs in this language are bare. We will therefore assume that these 
NPs start out as denoting properties in the intensional sense of the term and are of 
the semantic type <s,<e,t>>. Once these NPs undergo a type shift and come to 
denote objects or sets in a given world (whether the actual one or not), they also 
receive a commitment to existence in this world. In contrast, an NP that retains its 
original property, or concept, interpretation will lack existential commitment of 
                                                                                                                                     
existential commitment in the traditional sense may still lack commitment to existence in a 
location, which makes genitive Case-assignment available.  
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denotes a function from possible worlds to sets of individuals, and nothing in its 
semantics eliminates the possibility that in some of these worlds, the value of the 
function turns out to be an empty set.  
  Thus, the absence of REC characterizes those NPs that denote properties 
or concepts, rather than undergoing a type-shift and coming to refer to or quantify 
over individuals in any given possible world. I propose that only such property-
denoting NPs can appear in Irrealis Genitive Case. This proposal strongly relates 
to Zimmermann’s (1993) analysis, according to which objects of intensional verbs 
denote properties, and the discussion of this issue in van Geenhoven and McNally 
(2005). I assume, however, that even an intensionally interpreted NP may be 
restricted in its denotation to a particular set of possible worlds introduced by the 
predicate, rather than encoding a property as a whole. It is only when the 
denotation of an NP is not reduced to any limited set of possible worlds, but rather 
constitutes the default property interpretation, that Irrealis Genitive Case will be 
assigned.      
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